[6] Plaintiffs next argue that Section 1256 is void for vagueness. a criminal statute must "define a criminal offense with sufficient certainty so as to inform a person of ordinary intelligence of conduct which is proscribed, and such that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is not encouraged." State v. Cantrell, 151 Vt. 130, 133, 558 A.2d 639, 641 (1989). Lack of statutory clarity offends notions of due process for "no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." State v. Dragon, 133 Vt. 620, 621, 349 A.2d 720, 721 (1975) (discussing hooding of United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)). The test is less strict, however, when, as here, the statute does not threaten to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. See Rogers v. Watson, 156 Vt. 483, 491, 594 A.2d 409, 414 (1991). Plaintiffs attack the validity of Section 1256 on both prongs of the Cantrell vagueness test.
We have previously stated that "[v]agueness challenges to statutes not involving First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts." State v. Roy, 140 Vt. 219, 229, 436 A.2d 1090, 1095 (1981); see also Cantrell, 151 Vt. at 133, 558 complain about how statute will be applied to others). Given the procedural posture of this case, however, it is impossible to evaluate plaintiffs' challenges in a factual setting. Thus, we address on the facial validity of the statute, and not the validity of the statute as applied.
We find plaintiffs' attack unavailing. It is difficult to see how the statute could be more specific. It clearly proscribes the failure to wear an approved helmet. Plaintiffs' attack is really on the method of administration by the Vermont Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that motorcyclists do not have fair warning because "it is virtually impossible for the motorcyclist to find out what headgear is 'approved by the commissioner.'" This in turn, plaintiffs argue, makes it impossible for police to know what is or is not an approved helmet, leading to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. In support of this latter contention, plaintiffs offered the testimony of the deputy sheriff, sheriff and state's attorney for Caledonia County, all of whom suggested that enforcement of Section 1256 was difficult, if not impossible, due to the vagueness of the statute. Additionally, plaintiffs produced testimony from defense attorneys who were similarly confounded by the statute.
In essence, plaintiffs have turned a disagreement over how the statute should be implemented by the Commissioner into a void-for-vagueness challenge. in another regulatory context, we have held that "it is important that defendants had the opportunity to clarify their responsibilities and did not use it." Rogers, 156 Vt. at 491, 594 A.2d at 414. We are very reluctant to strike down a safety regime on a vagueness rationale with no showing that affected parties on request cannot obtain guidance on how to comply. We believe this deficiency is fatal to a facial challenge to the statute and its administration.
In any event, we find that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles has been sufficiently clear about what headgear is acceptable. By regulation, the Commissioner has provided that a helmet is deemed approved by the Commissioner if it (1) meets the standards set out by the Motorcycle, Scooter, Allied Trades Association; the American Standards Association Inc. Z90.1; or the United States Department of Transportation Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) 218 (49 C.F.R. Section 571.218), and (2) an "approval certificate" has been issued for it by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators. See Vermont Agency of Transportation, Motorcycle Protection Headgear Approval Regulations Section 4 (1987). Contrary to the plaintiffs' position, we construe this regulation to mean that a helmet is approved by the Commissioner if approved by one of the standard-setting organizations pursuant to its regulations. Thus, the dispute here goes to whether operators and law enforcement personnel can determine which helmets have been approved.
The easiest method is lablelling. Each set of standards provides for the labelling of an approved helmet. See id., Part A, Section 12.1 (Motorcycle, Scooter, Allied Trades Association labelling); Part B, Section 8 (American Standards Association); Part C, Section S5.6 (FMVSS). For example, helmets that have been approved under the FMVSS standard bear the widely recognized United States Department of Transportation (DOT) symbol. The "steel pot" infantry helmet, used as the main example by plaintiffs, lacks the labelling that shows approval.
[7] If labelling does not provide a certain result, motorcyclists may consult the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrator's list, which is maintained by the Commissioner. The statement accompanying the regulations provides that a certificate of approval for each approved helmet is filed with the Commissioner. The fact that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles does not maintain a specific state list of approved helmets also does not render the statute or the method of administration infirm.
Plaintiffs also claim that the statute is impermissibly vague and enforced discriminatory because Vermont State Police have been instructed to look only for the DOT symbol on helmets, and not taught to be concerned with labelling by either of the other two associations. This allegation goes to the actual enforcement of Section 1256 and is outside the scope of plaintiffs' facial assault. We will not consider it.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that Section 1256 deprives them of the "equal protection of the laws (fn7) guaranteed by Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution. This article of the constitution provides: "That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men . . . " Plaintiffs make three distinct arguments: (1) motorcyclists are unfairly singled out for treatment different from all other highway users; (2) the statute requires a safety device, the helmet, that lessens some dangers, but increases others; and (3) the statute undermines its public safety purpose by requiring reflectorization without warning of the potential dangers of adhesive application to the helmet.
[8] "[U]nless a 'fundamental right or suspect class is involved,' a statute comports with Article 7 if it is reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose." State v. George, 157 Vt. 580, 588, 602 A.2d 953, 957 (1991) (quoting Choquette v. Perrault, 153 Vt. 45, 52, 569 A.2d 455, 458 (1989)). There is no fundamental right here. To prevail, one "must show that he was treated differently as a member of one class from treatment of members of another class similarly situated." Id. at 585, 602 A.2d at 956.
[9] These challenges do not require extensive analysis. The requirement that motorcyclists don protective headgear before taking to the public highways is simply a recognition that motorcyclists do not enjoy the physical protection furnished by the body of a car or truck. We conclude that "[i]t is not difficult to discern a rational basis for the legislature's distinction between motorcyclists and . . . automobile drivers, whose vehicle affords them substantially more protection than does a motorcycle." Simon, 246 F.Supp. at 279. Similarly, the Legislature can apply the helmet requirement to motorcycles and not to mopeds. A statute need not regulate the whole of a field to pass constitutional muster. See LeCLair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Commonwealth v. Guest, 425 N.E.2d 779, 780 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (court will not invalidate statute merely because legislature has not addressed entire problem in defining a classification). There is a rational basis for the distinction between motorcyclists and moped riders since the latter travel on average at a lower rate of speed and are forbidden from riding on state highways. See Commonwealth v. Kautz, 491 A.2d 864, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (upholding helmet law on federal equal protection grounds); State v. Acker, 485 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Utah 1971) (upholding law requiring helmets to be worn on roadways where the minimum posted speed is above thirty-five miles per hour, reasons that "harm from collisions and other mishaps increases directly as the square of speed").
We have already considered plaintiffs' claim that the statute is flawed because it fails to deal with the dangers of helmet usage. This argument is for the Legislature, not this Court.
[10] Finally, plaintiffs claim that Section 1256 undermines its public safety purpose by requiring reflectorization without warning of the potential dangers of adhesive application to the helmet. Based on expert testimony, the trial court found that reflective adhesive tape cannot adversely affect the structural integrity of a motorcycle helmet. Despite the court's additional finding that certain materials (fn8) should not be used on helmets, the court's determination that reflectorization does not impair a helmet's structural integrity is not clearly erroneous and will not be overturned on appeal. See V.R.C.P. 52(a)(2).
In summary, we find no reason to overrule Solomon. As a result, we reiterate our conclusion that Section 1256 "in no way violates any of the provisions of our state and federal constitution." Solomon, 128 Vt. at 202, 260 A.2d at 380.
Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES:
1. Plaintiffs Benning and the Northeast Kingdom Chapter originally filed suit against Jeffrey Amestoy in his capacity as Attorney General of the State of Vermont. Pursuant to a November 1991 stipulation, the State of Vermont was substituted as defendant in lieu of the Attorney General, and the parent organization of Freedom of the Road was added as a party plaintiff.
Defendant has not argued that this challenge to a criminal statute is improper or that any of the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. Therefore, we have not considered these questions. (Return)
2. In their complaint, plaintiffs contended that Section 1256 violated both federal and state constitutional provisions. However, on appeal, plaintiffs have briefed only the state constitutional issues. While this Court need not address matters not adequately briefed, see Rowe v. Brown, 157 Vt. 373, 379, 599 A.2d 333, 337 (1991), our treatment of the state constitutional issues necessarily implicates the federal constitution. Although the state constitution may afford greater individual rights than its federal counterpart, State v. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. 1, 4, 587 A.2d 988, 991 (1991), it may no derogate any rights guaranteed under the latter, In re E. C.T., 141 Vt. 375, 378 449 A.2d 937, 938 (1982). As a result, a conclusion of constitutionality under Vermont constitutional provisions necessarily imposes a similar conclusion under comparable provisions of the federal constitution. (Return)
3. The closest we have come is to hold that the liberty interest protected by Article 1 is sufficiently important that involuntary mental health treatment orders deny due process of law if of indefinite duration. See In re G.K., 147 Vt. 174, 178, 514 A.2d 1031, 1033 (1986); see also G.T. v. Stone, 159 Vt. 607, 613-14, 622 A.2d 491, 494-95 (1992) (Article 1 requires hearing before revocation of conditional discharge from state mental institution). The nature of the liberty interest in G.K. makes that precedent unhelpful to plaintiffs in this case. (Return)
4. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a few courts did overrule motorcycle helmet laws; however, these decisions were in turn overruled. See Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1520 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases); see, e.g., People of City of Adrian v. Poucher, 247 N.W.2d 798, 799 (Mich. 1976), overruling American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d (Mich. Ct. App. 1968). (Return)
5. We do note that some states have chosen to revise their mandatory helmet laws to require protective headgear only for minors after upholding the constitutionality of the mandatory law. See. e.g., Alaska Stat. Section 28.35.245 (1989). We do not believe that such changes in any way undercut the rationale of these decisions. (Return)
6. Unlike denial of certiorari, United States Supreme Court summary affirmance decisions are entitled to full precedential effect as to the judgment itself. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975); see also Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). (Return)
7. Plaintiff's wording comes from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and not Article 7. Although the provisions have some similarity of purpose, they are not identical. (Return)
Back to HLDL home page.