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# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. BARTON, JUDGBEC 1 4 2004

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPUTY SANTA CRUZ COUNTY DEPUTY DEPUTY

Defendant.

# REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Santa Cruz, California Friday, November 19, 2004 Department 2

#### **APPEARANCES**

## For the People:

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GRETCHEN BROCK Assistant District Attorney

#### For the Defendant:

RICHARD QUIGLEY
In Propria Persona

Official Court Reporter TANIS J. O'CONNOR, CSR 7553

### SANTA CRUZ, CA PROCEEDINGS NOVEMBER 19, 2004

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THE COURT: All right. So let's go on the record, then, on the Quigley matters. Mr. Quigley is present. Ms. Brock is present.

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I'm having the reporter take this down, because
I'm assuming that, no matter what, somebody is going to
take it somewhere, and it's easier than dealing with the
tape recordings. I realize that they've been working well,
and we may be, believe it or not, going back to those in
misdemeanor land.

All right. After reading and rereading all of the information that was presented, first, that 27802 and 27803 were enacted with the goal of preventing injuries to motorcyclists and passengers; such is the legislative intent, and <u>Buhl</u>, at page 1619.

Second, that 27803 requires wearing a safety helmet. Cyclists and passengers must wear a helmet meeting requirements of 27802, which also then incorporates FMVSS 218.

That's "Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards," and I did that for the reporter.

Third, the requirement to decide fabrication is not necessary and is absurd - again, quoting <u>Buhl</u>, at page 1622 - and there needs to be a helmet with certification of compliance with Department of Transportation.

DOT - D-O-T - presents a rebuttable presumption, which is discussed in <a href="Bianco">Bianco</a>, at page 1119.

The terms of legislative statutes may be reasonably certain by reference to other definable sources, which is <a href="MacMillen">MacMillen</a>, at page 673 - and it's spelled M-a-c-M-i-l-e-n - also quoting <a href="Buhl">Buhl</a>.

Sixth, standards of this kind are not impermissibly vague and provide their -- provided their meaning can be objectively ascertained by reference to common experiences of mankind. Again, MacMillen, at 673, and Buhl at 1623.

Seven, the DOT presumption can be rebutted if it does not conform to the federal standards. It's a self-certification, but it can be rebutted. Again, Bianco, at 1123.

Reading 27803 and 27802, plus FMVSS 218, with the common experiences of mankind, as related to in <u>Buhl</u>, plaintiff -- People's 5 does not conform as a helmet, as demonstrated with the evidence, in that it will not withstand a strike, nor will it perform as discussed in FMVSS 218.

Harmonizing 27802 and 27803 and FMVSS 218 and the legislative intent, and that is, it is an additional safety benefit - again, quoting <u>Buhl</u> - to motorcyclists and passengers, a helmet used in this context must be a safety benefit, something more than a deflector of rain and sun.

Notwithstanding the discussion of Defendant's K, which is, I believe, the pilot's helmet that Mr. Quigley produced as a -- an example, off the Internet, a reasonable, definable source - again, Webster's, Black's - common experience would lead a person to expect and have a helmet having a hard shell or a surface to protect.

Otherwise, the discussion of anvils, strikers, and penetration -- depth of penetration in FMVSS 218 is of no value if the intent is to protect from other than a form of impact.

It is then the Court's judgment that there is, as indicated, a rebuttable presumption, and that, Mr. Quigley, you're now on notice that that presumption has been rebutted by reasonable common definitions, and that the statute requires more than a soft covering for your head and more than a Dixie cup with string and a DOT sticker.

My concern is that, with that notice and reading <a href="Bianco">Bianco</a> and reading <a href="Buhl">Buhl</a>, that what I will indicate -- and I need clarification from either of you -- or, Mr. Quigley, I'll take it from you: There's the one ticket that you indicated you had no headgear at all that you pled to.

MR. QUIGLEY: I had -- I entered no contest to that one in June. I believe it was the 11th -- either 6th or the 11th, in Watsonville.

THE COURT: All right. So, obviously, that one you've admitted.

The others, what I'm finding is that, in relation to the statute, that your helmet does not comply and that you are now on notice that that helmet, nor any other soft item as a covering, complies, but I will find, then, that it is at this point, in relation to <u>Bianco</u> and in relation to that rebuttal presumption, that they are then, the remainders, as fix-it tickets.

In that the presumption has now been rebutted, you are on notice, and you now have to comply with 27802 and 27803 in a manner other than wearing a soft covering.

In relation to the one ticket that you pled no contest to, with no helmet -- no head covering, I -- and I want to make it clear on that.

It's \$161 fine?

THE CLERK: Should be right in there, Your Honor.

(The Court and the clerk confer momentarily.)

THE COURT: Well, I guess it's two questions:

Because you pled no contest to both of those charges in

that case --

MR. QUIGLEY: No, I pled no contest to --

THE COURT: The turn signals.

MR. QUIGLEY: -- the turn signals. That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And have you corrected that?

MR. QUIGLEY: Your Honor, I've been -- I've been

working, since I got the first ticket on July 24th, 2003, to take care of that, and I have been absolutely swamped with distractions and the shutdown of my business in Watsonville ever since. So I haven't had the money, but, yes, I'm working on that and fully intend to take care of it. It's not something I'm ignoring. It's something I'm trying to fix.

THE COURT: I'm just -- because it makes a difference in the fine amount. If it's corrected, it's a lesser fine than if it isn't. You understand that? So all I'm asking --

MR. QUIGLEY: I think I understand a couple things that you don't, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. QUIGLEY: One of them is that unless you know a buyer for it, I'm going to have to go find a buyer for my bike, 'cause I can't ride my motorcycle anymore, at least in Santa Cruz. I can't climb over a common objective experience standard. I cannot do that, and they will charge it as a misdemeanor and I'm done. I -- I would hope that the Court will give me some sort of paperwork to get me home, but I'm done riding until this case is settled.

I would hesitate to point out, Your Honor, that we didn't talk about 40303.5 relative to the no-helmet ticket. I have not had an opportunity to face those arguments, or argue that position at all, relative to the

no -- the not guilty plea on that one ticket.

THE COURT: You mean the --

MR. QUIGLEY: It was my understanding that sentencing was going to be separate as to one or all of them.

THE COURT: I'll do that.

MR. QUIGLEY: Well, I think I'm entitled to that, just as a matter of -- as a matter of law. The 403 -- 40303.5 has enough shells in it that it's pretty much unavoidable.

I -- you're not through ruling. I've got a couple of things I'd like to ask you when you're done.

MS. BROCK: Your Honor, Judge Danner, in a previous appeal, ruled that it is not a fix-it ticket, failure to wear a helmet, because it's an equipment violation that you cannot go back and fix at a later date in time. He cannot go back to May 30th and wear a helmet and then be absolved of the charges.

THE COURT: I understand that, but what I'm indicating, at least in my reading of <u>Bianco</u>, especially in discussion of <u>Bianco</u> where it is, or was, event specific to an item, that the presumption -- the rebuttable presumption had been rebutted, that then the issue is notice to Mr. Quigley.

MS. BROCK: Well, he was put on notice when he was convicted by Judge Danner.

MR. QUIGLEY: With great respect, Your Honor, no more notice than I received here today. I don't mean to sound rude, and I'm certainly not challenging the Court in its greater scheme, but I do not believe that this Court -- I do not believe that this Court can make a determination of noncompliance, in any provision I know of law, on any -- any piece of equipment with federal standards. That is a function reserved for the federal courts, and I'm at a loss to understand how I failed to convey that.

But back to the correctability --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. QUIGLEY: -- I will rely, Your Honor, on the statutes and the language of the statutes.

Judge Danner, unfortunately, did not rely on the statutes or the language of the statutes, and if I'm given an opportunity to discuss that, I'll be more than happy to walk through it.

I have already -- in the documents in front of you, you already have a nod from the chief justice of the Supreme Court of this state, who was then associate justice. You already have a nod from the attorney general of this state, who was at the time a senator of this state, that 40303.5 does in fact make helmet tickets correctable offenses.

THE COURT: And I haven't said it wasn't.

MR. QUIGLEY: Okay. I'm --

THE COURT: I mean, that was the first thing I said. MR. OUIGLEY: Well, relative to the tickets that I -- that I've been --THE COURT: That: --5 MR. QUIGLEY: The ones I received a notice on, 7 I'm assuming that I'm being found not quilty of those 'cause I didn't have notice there was anything wrong with 9 my headgear. Am I misreading your decision? 10 11 THE COURT: Somewhat. MR. QUIGLEY: Well, okay. Could I ask you, Your 12 Honor, to cut to the chase? 13 THE COURT: And that's what I'm doing. 14 15 MR. QUIGLEY: Okay. THE COURT: Because you said there was nothing 1.6 17 wrong with your headqear, and what I'm saying is that, based upon everything that's presented to me, I'm finding 18 it doesn't comply with 27802 and 27803. 19 20 MR. QUIGLEY: But that is because you found it 21 doesn't comply with 218. 22 THE COURT: And that it doesn't comply with 218, based upon what I've indicated. 23 Now, what I've also said, in relation to those, 24 25 is that I'm finding that they're fixable. 26 MR. QUIGLEY: Yes, Your Honor. Understood.

THE COURT: The only issue was -- then, was the one where you had no helmet -- had no headgear, so I don't confuse those terms --

MR. QUIGLEY: Yes.

THE COURT: -- you had no headgear and you pled no contest to, that I'm --

MR. QUIGLEY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- finding, because of the -- because you know what the statute is, and that is that you have to have a helmet, that that isn't, in and of itself, fixable. That's why I went to that one case number.

MR. QUIGLEY: Okay. To argue the sentencing portion of that ruling, I would argue, Your Honor, that I had no more idea how to comply with the helmet law when I was riding bareheaded than when I was wearing the headgear that you just made a determination of noncompliance on.

My question has been and remains the same, and absent an answer to that question, I leave here absolutely open prey to anybody, for any reason, that wants to put their common sense against mine, which is pretty easy to do, 'cause I think I've demonstrated in a period of 13 years and six months that I have an absence of common sense. Just don't have any.

So given that, I don't know who would sign off the other tickets, Your Honor. I would ask you to, but I would -- I would venture to say that you didn't spend your

entire life accumulating what you've accumulated to put it on the line to sign off -- I mean to certify what the government has so carefully avoided certifying. So I don't know who would sign those off.

THE COURT: Well, and that may be the next issue that we're going to deal with, and that's why I'm sort of framing it as is, but, at least in my view of the entirety of this, even at this point assuming that People's 5 was a helmet, because that was your argument, that the item that was marked 5 was a helmet, you knew how to comply, because you could wear that helmet, which then would put you in a rebuttable presumption.

MR. QUIGLEY: Understood.

THE COURT: So that's why I'm saying that you had at least information and knowledge, in relation to your bareheaded riding, to try to comply.

MR. QUIGLEY: Okay. I don't --

THE COURT: That's why I'm saying --

MR. QUIGLEY: I don't think I understand, but that's why God made time. I'll have time to work that out.

THE COURT: That's why I'm saying it wasn't -that one isn't a fixable ticket, in that you had knowledge
of how, at least in -- even in your frame of reference, how
to comply with 27802 and 27803. You could have worn that
helmet with the "DOT" on the back.

MR. QUIGLEY: But, you see, except for the

arrest, there was little difference in how they responded, is my point.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. QUIGLEY: If they respond with a citation for wearing a helmet, respond with a citation for not wearing a helmet, then, you know, I'm -- it's six of one and half a dozen of the other.

I did that to make a point.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. QUIGLEY: And the point is that it is a correctable violation, and it would be pretty much like, did I know my taillight was burnt out on my way to fix it? And, sure, I knew it was burnt out on my way to fix it, but there's no harm to my fellow roadway users, and as long as there's no harm to my fellow roadway users, I'm out searching for that DOT-approved helmet, and I will probably spend the rest of my whole life looking for that DOT-approved helmet.

Now, I've been told that it's in the chicken feed file in the elephant's graveyard, but that just complicates it more.

THE COURT: When do you want to deal with sentencing, then, in relation to that one?

MS. BROCK: Your Honor, what about the May 30th incident, where the officers testified he did not have a helmet on? The Memorial Day incident.

THE COURT: I think it was the 31st.

MS. BROCK: The 31st.

THE COURT: I'll get to it in a minute.

So in relation to the bareheaded ride, so that we can segregate them, when do you want to deal with sentencing on that?

MR. QUIGLEY: Your pick, Your Honor.

THE COURT: When do you think you can fix your turn signals? I mean, I realize you've said it's been a while.

MR. QUIGLEY: You know, I'm trying to get it done by -- actually, at this point there's no need, except for getting that ticket signed off. I'm serious. I'm parking my dream machine, Judge. I don't see how I could possibly leave the house facing jail time over a subjective opinion of what my helmet is. That was the reason for that federal injunction. That's the reason that I'll be going back to the federal court to seek relief. I've got no choice in that.

So, you know, as soon as I can, which has been my mission from day one.

I also would hesitate to point out, Judge, that my other motorcycle doesn't have any.

THE COURT: No turn signals?

MR. QUIGLEY: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. What year is -- what's the

vintage of that motorcycle?

MR. QUIGLEY: '72.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. QUIGLEY: So it wasn't required till '74.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. QUIGLEY: My point being that it's not one of those things that's a necessity for safety, or they'd be making me put it on my '72, and I use my hand signals when I turn and in all other ways, you know, try to let everybody know what it is that I'm going to do, so that, unless they're really dedicated to do that, they're not going to kill me. So I'm not an idiot, and if I thought turn signals would in any way become a factor on whether or not I was going to make it home, I would have already, you know, stolen some off of a truck, or something, and slapped them on there and have them hanging off everywhere, but I'm trying to get something that will look decent with a motorcycle.

Can you give me till the end of the year to have somebody -- I guess somebody will have to come up to the property and look at it, 'cause I'm not going to be able to bring it down here.

THE COURT: All right. How about the 27th of December?

MR. QUIGLEY: Sure. I'll be 61 and two days that day, Your Honor. Let's do it.

THE COURT: Now, what I'm doing, then, is, notwithstanding the prior ticket, my narrow reading of <u>Buhl</u> and, specifically, of <u>Bianco</u>, is that in relation to these tickets, I'm finding them correctable to the extent that Mr. Quigley is now on notice that that helmet -- or that headgear does not qualify, and he will not ride without a hard-shell, qualifying helmet.

In relation to the other judgment of Judge

Danner, I'll certify that at this point, because it's gone
through appeal and we're at it. So that's where we're at.

MS. BROCK: And can those convictions from Judge Danner's case be certified to DMV?

THE COURT: I guess we'll do that.

MS. BROCK: Thank you.

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MR. QUIGLEY: What would be the point in certifying tickets to the DMV?

THE COURT: Don't know. That's between, I guess, DMV and the court, and I'll figure out what I'm going to do with that before --

MR. QUIGLEY: Well, what does --

THE COURT: Hang on.

MR. QUIGLEY: What does it mean, Judge?

THE COURT: Well, wait. Hang on. I'll find out exactly what the import and the meaning of that is, and before I certify them, we'll deal with it on the 27th, 'cause I'm not sure exactly the meaning, so I'll wait till

1 the 27th, but that's my intent. All right. So we're in recess on this matter. 3 MR. QUIGLEY: I'm sorry, Judge? THE COURT: So before they get certified, I'll 5 listen to you, but I also will give you the information of what it means on the 27th. 6 MR. QUIGLEY: Oh, okay. 8 THE COURT: So we're in recess now. 9 (Momentary discussion off the record.) 10 THE COURT: Okay. We're going back to Quigley 11 again. 12 MR. QUIGLEY: You said you were going to deal 13 with that May 31 --14 THE COURT: I'll find, based upon the testimony, 15 that you had People's 5, or an equivalent of People's 5, and I'll lump it in with the others, which is fixable. 16 17 MR. QUIGLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: You're welcome. 18 19 MR. QUIGLEY: And who's going to sign these off? 20 THE COURT: We'll deal with that by the 27th too, 21 'cause I'm assuming somebody is going to take me up, and so it won't be a judgment. So we'll see you on the 27th. 22 MR. QUIGLEY: Okay. Thank you very much, Judge. 23 THE COURT: You're welcome. 24 (Proceedings adjourned.) 25 26 --000--

STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ I, TANIS J. O'CONNOR, a Certified Shorthand 9 Reporter, License No. 7553, in and for the State of 10 California; do hereby certify: 11 That the foregoing proceedings were taken down by 12 me in shorthand at the time and place therein named and was 13 thereafter transcribed by means of computer-aided 14 transcription; and the same is a true, correct and complete 15 transcript of the said proceedings. I further certify that I am not of counsel or 16 17 attorney for any of the parties hereto, or in any way interested in the events of this case, and that I am not 18 related to any party hereto. 19 20 Dated, this 14th day of December, 2004. 21 22 23 24 25 26

TANIS J. 6'CONNOR, CSR 7553

Official Reporter