C: = Traffic Referee John Mulligan
DA: = Paul Marigandi, Assistant District Attorney
D: = Richard Quigley
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C: (The People) . . . are represented by Mr. Marigandi. Mr. Quigley is present. This is the time for the three trials. And you're prepared to go, sir?

D: Oh, I'm ah . . . there'll be no trial today, your honor. No. We're gonna do a couple of things and I'll be entering a plea if we don't get this worked out.

C: Okay.

D: But there won't be no trial. No point in it. . . . I'm looking for Mr. Rico, because that's the only, that's the only ticket I'm going to challenge directly at all.

DA: Okay, I . . .

D: The rest of them I intend, excuse me . . .

DA: Well, no. I just wanted to let Mr. Quigley know that ah and the court know that Deputy Rico is the bailiff in Department twelve today in Watsonville. They do have a jury ah trial going that I believe is supposed to start any minute now, ah . . . Field Training Officer Lindsey of the Detention Bureau asked me this morning to let him know when Deputy Rico would be needed, in which case then he would have relief available for Deputy Rico in Watsonville. So, if Mr. Quigley does require Deputy Rico, I need to let Deputy Lindsay know now.

D: In any case, I'd like to deal with some pre-trial stuff before . . . yeah, pre-trial stuff before I enter my pleas. And the reason that I'm doing that is that it is clear to me that in the arena that I'm working, with the law being interpreted as it is, and being ignored the rest of the time, that there's no way for me to prevail on anything. I um, it's just not possible, if the rules are what they are -- the laws don't count the way that they're written, and and the court decisions above this court have no standing in this court, then I'm left to where the prosecutor says this is what I wanna do and you say yeah, that's fine, and I'm dead, I'm dead meat. Those are just insurmountable to me. So what I'm gonna do this morning is I'm gonna get some stuff in the record, on the record, so that when it goes up on appeal . . . I'll be attempting to preserve my right of appeal to the best of my skills as a pro se litigant under twelve thirty-seven point five of the penal code, and under fifteen thirty-eight point five, I have a right to preserve appeal under both those statutes, and I'm not gonna bother to read them because I obviously am illiterate, I don't know what they say. And so, but my understanding of the statutes is that I have a right to appeal. But I want the court to take judicial notice initially, I believe I handed you a copy after I found it, based on your last ruling, of a case called the California Court Reporters Association Incorporated, et al, vs the Judicial Council of California. The set up for this, your honor, is this is a case that grew out of a determination by the Judicial Council that was in fact ah inconsistent with the statutes. Article six, section six of the California Constitution, addresses that behavior. I believe you've had time to review the copy. I know I gave a copy to Mr. Marigandi. I have gone through here and highlighted some of the points that I thought were important, one of which has to do with inconsistent means mutually repugnant or contradictory, contrary one to the other so that both cannot stand, the acceptance or establishment of one applies the abrogation or abandonment of the other. And there's no doubt that four oh three oh three point five says that everything in division twelve is correctable, and there's no doubt that the bail and penalty schedule says that one item in division twelve, two seven eight oh three bee, is not correctable, and that is what I would call an abrogation or abandonment of one over the other. So, I brought that in. One of the considerations that played heavily in this decision was the legislative intent. What I have done is I have again brought the court tangible stuff to support what it is that I contend. This is a letter from Rick Neal, an exhibit I would like entered into the record. This is a letter from Rick Neal on August twenty-fourth where he outlines why this statute is a correctable violation, and about the Judicial Council's impending intent to change it. He solicits, he had sent out an invitation to comment on the proposal, proposed changes, and right behind that, third page, you will find a letter of intent of Phil Wyman, Senator of the State of California, in which he points out clearly that it was always the intent of the Legislature that this be a correctable violation. Ah . . . Phil Wyman, Senator . . . did I just say Phil Wyman? Pardon me, are there two Phil Wyman letters?

C: You got one dated November twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-three.

D: I go two dated November twenty-fourth, ninety-three. What did I do? I didn't separate these? Maybe I don't have the right stuff.

DA: No, mine are separated.

D: Okay, there's a Woodruff in there.

DA: There's a Wiggland.

D: Wiggland, Woodruff and Wyman. If you have anything other than those, if you want to tear them out and give them back to me . . . there's three letters. All three legislators said exactly the same thing. These letters were sent to the Council before they made this determination. Now it's interesting that they made this determination relative to the correctability of the helmet law statute exactly the same day they made the determination that they were sued over in Court Reporters vs. the Judicial Council. So it was exactly the same people. They argued in their brief, and I hesitate to point out that they argued in their brief that because they are empowered by the Constitution, that they have co-equal powers with the State, ah with the Legislature. In fact it says exactly in the finding, in the opinion, the Judicial Council argues that as it and the Legislature both derive their power from the State Constitution, the two institutions are co-equals. The court wrote, we find this argument to be specious, and where I come from, which is a little bit south of the Mason-Dixon line, that's synonymous with stupid. So anyway, that was the argument that they made. The court obviously ruled in this decision that they can't do that, that they don't have co-equal standing with the legislature. It also repeats in there several times that is anybody is going to make a determination as to whether or not a statute is going to mean one thing or another, it will be the legislature or the courts. If there's a discussion about intent, it will be worked out by the legislature or the courts, and that hasn't been done. It's never been done, particularly in light of the evidence of legislative intent which I have brought and no one else has. So I would ask the court to take judicial notice of that opinion and enter those letters into the record. Oh by the way, so that you'll have evidence that they're bonefied legitimate letters, that I didn't just make them up on my computer, I have a copy of the fax cover that came from the California Judicial Council. Those letters were faxed to me yesterday.

DA: (garbled)

C: Show that to the DA please.

D: That's from counsel at the Judicial Council. You can have that because I have another copy . . .

C: So before we proceed, any objection?

DA: Well I think those are areas that the court can take judicial notice of if it wants.

C: Um, he's talking about the three letters also. The letter from Wyman . . . Wiggland.

DA: No, those are documents that the court can take judicial notice of.

D: Okay, one more . . . one more. And that is, I don't know why it's not in there, Quackenbush. Let me see what this guy says . . . of course he's not top on the list of credible individuals these days, but . . .

C: Okay, before you proceed, the documents you submitted into evidence are accepted.

D: Cool.

C: And are not part of the record.

D: And you have taken judicial notice of the opinion and if you were bound by opinions, you'd be bound by that one, right?

C: Well I've read that opinion. You've given it to me, yes.

D: Yeah. Okay. Next thing is Taggert vs. Superseer. Taggert vs. Superseer, and this is a terrible copy of it . . . Taggert vs. Superseer had to do with a helmet damned near killing a guy, and leaving him paralyzed for life, and from this guy's helmet. And everybody was in there talking about what a helmet is, and how it complies and how it don't comply, and what is and what isn't a helmet, and the fourth appellate court was real clear in their explanation about who get to make those decisions, and it's got nothing to do with anybody except the manufacturer or the D-O-T. Nobody but the manufacturer or the D-O-T gets to make those determinations. So I just want the court to take judicial notice of that decision, and you don't have to worry about the content, just the fact that it exists.

C: Okay, done.

D: Okay, the next thing is I'm having a little problem with the gentleman to my right. I ah am not an attorney as you know, so that there are certain liberties that have been taken with me. I think that the case is being prosecuted in bad faith against me. I do not believe that there's legitimate grounds for this case at all and never has been. But some of the chicanery is unacceptable. And the entry onto the record of comments about the description of my helmet, particularly specifically as a baseball cap, on more than one occasions, assumes facts not in evidence, is testifying from out here about facts not in evidence, and I think it pollutes the record on appeal, and I would move the court to strike every reference from the district attorney's mouth having to do with helmet fabrication. And that includes the reference that I'm riding around wearing a baseball cap. That is a fact not in evidence, and inappropriately brought up, mentioned at all on the record, and I would like it stricken from the record so that the appellate court is not confused by what I was wearing. That's not the issue on appeal.

C: Okay. Well first of all, that was not a trial. It was a motion hearing.

D: It doesn't make any difference. I am appealing . . . I am appealing the outcome of those hearings and I'm going to be moving that record forward. The reason we're not having a trial is so that . . . the trial court is not gonna have all these escape routes to run to, ah ah diversions. We're gonna deal with the legal facts of this case. Not somebody's opinion about what my attitude is, about what I'm wearing and why, about who gets to call it. None of that stuff's being ruled on. We're gonna be talking about your decisions. I've got it all laid out here. If you want time to read through my declaration in support of preserving my case for appeal upon entry of plea of nolo contendre, I got a copy for you right here. I'm ready to go.

(glitch in the tape, and it resumes . . .)

D: I'm also going to move for reconsideration on your finding relative to the correctable nature of a helmet ticket. I'm gonna make you rule that one more time with this new evidence, because I think it's important to make it real clear going up where it is that I'm going.

DA: Would the court like me to respond to that?

C: Please.

DA: Very simply, your honor, ah in light of a motion and the offers of proof that were made by Mr. Quigley, and the offers of proof that were made by the people, even though we didn't have any testimony taken and the people were prepared to . . . everything that's in the record that was ruled admissible by the court should be allowed in. And if Mr. Quigley is concerned about this correctable violation again, well, you know, I am willing to (garbled) to Mr. Quigley very simply to vehicle code section four oh six one oh bee. The disqualifying conditions on a correctable violation are, evidence of fraud or persistent neglect, the violation represents an immediate safety hazard, and the violator does not agree to or cannot promptly correct the violation. It's the people's position based on the offers of proof and the facts that would have been presented by the people had these motions actually gone to testimony, or had this gone to trial and testimony, is that Mr. Quigley falls under all three of those categories. And I believe that the court, sitting as the finder of fact, sitting with the information that it has for it, can find that these are not correctable under four oh six one oh bee if the court looks at those conditions in light of the facts that have been offered before you in the motions that we went over two weeks ago before you ah it's abundantly clear that these are not correctable violations under that statute.

D: May I respond now?

C: Yes sir.

D: That's absurd. The reason it's absurd is, and I would like the court to take judicial notice of the fact that when I was in Judge Danner's court, I asked, he asked for my plea and I told him I didn't know how to plea to four oh six one oh, and the District Attorney at that time said, confirmed, I am not charged with violating four oh six one oh. I'm charged with violating two seven eight oh three as an infraction. No one has specified any allegations of any of four oh six one oh against me. I have no idea what those charges would be. I would have no way to know how to respond to them. But, since he has put them on the table, let's do this. Let's talk about . . . because these are extreme circumstances, four oh six one oh. Because four oh six one oh compels arrest or impound, so let's do the first one. So let's do the first one, fraud or persistent neglect. Fraud, I believe, is the first one fraud. Who am I defrauding? The definition of fraud as it applies to four oh six one oh, has to do with someone in a helmet store, a motorcycle shop, that say that they are approved that are not approved. That's fraud. I ain't . . . I ain't . . . there ain't no fraud involved. If he want to allege fraud against me, I'm ready to go. Let's get down. Let's get with it. Cause there ain't no fraud. Two, immediate safety hazard? That's where it gets absurd, your honor. I have been riding around with exactly the same head gear, as you know, for well over a year. Now if immediate takes place after a year, even in four oh three oh two cee the most liberal extension of immediate I've every read, seventy-two hours, this failure of this product, this helmet here, this headgear, to create any sort of a hazard, manifest itself as any sort of harm to anyone, is the best evidence that it is not an immediate safety hazard, and as for three. And as for three, I stand absolutely prepared, and have never refused to correct it. And just as soon as the police have their ducks in a row, and they are prepared to know how to sign off a correctable helmet law violation, I'll go get that sucker signed off. So I'm not refusing to do that at all. So, as to any allegations he may choose to bring in the future of violation of four oh six one oh, I plead not guilty, not guilty and don't be ridiculous!

C: Thank you. . . . So getting back to your motion to order the District Attorney's remarks in the last hearing two weeks ago, which was June sixth I think it was, yes, remarks concerning a baseball cap or whatever (garbled), that is denied.

D: That . . . excuse me?

C: That is denied.

D: So he is allowed to testify to facts not in evidence?

C: He was not testifying. He was arguing. He did not testify.

D: I strongly object to that, your honor. If it becomes the king pin on which the appellate court swings, I'll go on record right now as there'll be Hell to pay. But go ahead. Do what you will.

C: Okay.

D: And as for reconsideration of the motion. . .

C: Yes.

D: . . . to follow the case law . . .

C: Yes.

D: . . . and deem this thing a correctable violation. You got all the stuff. I brought you the stuff. I brought you the case law. I brought you the legislative intent. You have all the tools, and you have the instructions from the fourth appellate that the court gets to make this decision, not the Judicial Council. The court gets to make this decision. Now, all that, on my motion for reconsideration, how do you rule?

C: Okay. I'm going to deny it. But . . . let me explain. I did read People vs. Court Reporter's Association, the case that you've been referring to. I read that. I also went to the law library . . . have read um . . . there's a brief comment in a law review article, a nineteen ninety-two law review article, Pacific Law Review, at page eight hundred . . . just had a few comments concerning the helmet law in California. Also in reading section two seven eight zero three, the last comment that was put in there by the legislature says it is the intent of the legislature to protect, I believe, children?

D: No. Provide an additional safety benefit to motorcycle operators and passengers, I believe is what it says.

DA: That all persons . . . it's under two seven eight oh three, subsection gee, it states, in enacting this section, it is the intent of the legislature to insure that all persons are provided with an additional safety benefit while operating or riding a motorcycle, motor-driven cycle, or motorized bicycle.

C: Yes.

D: And your contention based on your research, for the district attorney . . . I told you we don't need him here, your honor, you're doing all his work for him, if there's any work done. But go ahead on and rule on your own finding, on your own arguments, please. I wonder how this is going to come out?

C: Mr. Quigley, the reason I did all this is so I could be up to speed with you. You are very knowledgeable . . .

D: Yeah, but you see, you and I are on the same page and we're up to speed. With great respect to the public prosecutor, who's job it is by the way to see that the law is fairly enforced, not to get a conviction against Richard Quigley . . . he's lost track of that somewhere along the line. But . . . because if we followed the law, we ain't this far into it. We're done along time ago. But in light of that . . . whatever you decide, your honor. Did you find that you, that you figured it out for him?

C: Well, my decision is I'm not going to . . . my decision stands as I made on June sixth.

D: You are basing your decision on zero evidence that the helmet law has provided an additional safety benefit to anyone?

C: Right.

D: And that is a baseless conclusion. You have no facts in front of you to support that whatsoever. You're running on opinion and point of view, which you're entitled to . . . because I don't know what you're doing here in the first place. I never understood why I couldn't just refuse to accept your jurisdiction, but that's in my brief. So let's get it over, and get this thing done, and deal with the Rico ticket. And I move to dismiss that one because it's a bogus ticket. And it's bogus because, if you start out . . . first of all, he ain't here. Secondly, the first thing you ask every officer that comes into this court to testify at a trial is what, your honor? The DA will stipulate because he's gonna have to. And we'll make short work of this one. What's the first thing you ask every officer when they come in to testify in this court? Do you mind answering that for me?

C: Sure.

D: You ask them if they were in a marked patrol unit, right?

C: I ask . . . my standard questions that I ask when I call the trial is, are you employed by the agency, and were you in a marked patrol unit and in uniform when you issued the citation?

D: Okay, and what happens if they answer no to number two?

C: That they are not . . . then the next step is, was their primary function that day for traffic adjudication?

D: And if the answer to that is also no, then what do you do?

C: If their primary function is not traffic adjudication, then the ticket can go forward.

D: I beg your pardon?

C: If the officer that wrote the citation is not in uniform, or not in a patrol unit, but writes a traffic violation . . . speeding ticket . . . if their primary purpose that day was traffic enforcement, then they have to be in a marked patrol unit and in uniform. But if their primary purpose that day was not traffic enforcement . . .

D: Like bailiff?

C: . . . then the citation can proceed.

D: Really?

C: Yes sir.

D: Cool. Well then I guess it doesn't matter that Mr. Rico a bailiff, driving a prisoner transport vehicle, and that he wrote the ticket on county property, ah city property, right out in front of this county building? Because I move to dismiss that he had no jurisdiction to write that in the first place. And I will have to change that brief you have in front of you if you decide that you're gonna go ahead and hold that ticket in, we're going to make that another issue on appeal. Here we go. Because I don't believe that he can be running around as a bailiff, stopping people for correctable, fix-it ticket violations, on the contention that I wasn't wearing a dot approved helmet, which is the only question that he asked me, is that helmet dot approved.

DA: Your honor . . .

C: Do you want to call Deputy Rico.

DA: If Mr. Quigley is challenging that, we're going to have to have Deputy Rico testify. My answer to Mr. Quigley's contention at that point is that as a deputy sheriff for the County of Santa Cruz, Deputy Rico has jurisdiction throughout the county to enforce the laws. He's not bound in any one jurisdiction or another.

D: That doesn't comply with the government code. . . . If you'll give me a minute I'll dig that out. I did not mean to interrupt, Mr. Marigandi. I'll look it up here, I got it.

DA: Well, I . . .

D: Also, I didn't get discovery from any of these guys.

DA: Well, I don't know what Mr. Quigley wants to do here. I mean, I have Deputy McConnell and Deputy VanHorsen here. I have Deputy Rico who's a half-hour away. And if we're going to need him, we need to call him now . . . if there's going to be a trial in which his testimony is needed.

D: No, there's not going to be any . . . there's not going to be any testimony on the record in conflict with the Buhl decision.

C: Okay.

D: I'm going to abide by the law even if this court and the District Attorney are not. I'm going to abide by the law. The law says . . . and oh, by the way, I want that on the record so that you understand where I'm coming from. I don't think you understand where I'm coming from. I challenged the constitutionality of this statute based on Buhl. Buhl dealt with the constitutionality of the statute specifically the vagueness area . . . they dealt with about six different areas. But relative to the vagueness, now you can't go to the area where they're talking about do you get to wear a turban because it's freedom of religion, and cite what they said there dealing with the vagueness argument, when they dealt with the vagueness argument specifically. Specifically dealing with the vagueness argument, the Buhl court wrote, and this is in total, if I can find it, appellants contend that the helmet law is void for vagueness under Federal and State constitutions in that it quote describes a standard which cannot be understood by persons of ordinary intelligence end quote. They assert neither motorcyclists nor police officers can tell whether a particular helmet complies. Their first claim in this respect is that the law is too specific, the incorporated Federal safety standards are so technical, one must be a physicist or engineer testing a product in a laboratory to ascertain whether a product helmet complies. But underlying this argument is the proposition that the statute requires the consumer or enforcement officer to decide if a helmet is properly fabricated, and such a reading of two seven eight oh three is absurd. When sections two seven eight oh two and two seven eight oh three are harmonized as they must be, it is clear the law requires only that the consumer wear a helmet bearing a certification of compliance, which has since been deemed a dot sticker. The only basis for the ruling that this law is constitutional, on a vagueness challenge, is that it would be absurd for anyone to read two seven eight oh two and two seven eight oh three to require a consumer or enforcement officer to determine proper helmet fabrication, which is exactly what you have to do to move forward with this case.

C: Case number nine zero two zero seven zero three seven, the citation that was issued on June twenty-fourth of ninety-nine by deputy McConnell, . . .

D: What about it?

C: . . . how do you plead? . . . Are you changing your plea?

D: I'm changing your plea. I never entered a plea.

C: So . . .

D: I don't plea to traffic tickets. I move one more time to dismiss. I never did get an answer to my discovery. I want the court to take judicial notice . . .

C: Wait, wait, wait . . .

D: . . . that I never got an answer to my discovery. I didn't get answer to my discovery.

C: Calm down. One at a time. First of all you wanted a dismissal of Deputy Rico's ticket.

D: Yeah, you denied that. I got it.

C: That has been denied.

D: Yeah, nobody has to follow the law here but me, and the law I don't have to follow, I just have to follow Mr. Marigandi's interpretation, I got it. I got it. I don't know how I'm gonna make it home today, but I got it.

C: So moving along . . .

D: Moving along, I never did get any discovery from these people and I asked them for stuff that the law requires. Now I understand that we don't care what the law requires, but I asked for the stuff that the law . . . (garbled) they're supposed to produce . . . they gave me nothing.

C: This is the first I'm hearing of this.

D: That's because we weren't at trial, your honor. We were dealing with . . . we were dealing with the motions, you know. We were gonna have a constitutional challenge . . . these are all things I was gonna get to talk about then. And now you're sitting here wanting to try me and I'm sitting here saying that would be fine except I never got no damned evidence. I sit there and I ask for specific stuff. I lay it out there. They are supposed to give it to me, and what they do is give me copies of the tickets. I got copies of the tickets. I don't care about these. They're all wrong anyway.

C: Well, they gave you copies of the tickets, front and back . . . notes on the back?

D: Yeah. That ain't what I asked for. I asked for, oh me . . .

C: Well, have you brought a motion to that effect?

D: To what effect? To compel them to answer? They all showed up here on subpoena and you let them go faster than they come through the door. Every one of them was supposed to bring stuff and none of them brought any of it. I ain't seen nothing. They got nothing. And I repeat, because the court doesn't wanna listen to that either, that the Ninth Appellate Court ruled that this is a specific intent statute . . . you don't just get to run down the road like you do for somebody running a stop sign. You gotta show that there's specific intent. And you can't do it without this evidence. They couldn't do it so I subpoenaed the evidence because I thought we were going to be dealing with these things legit. I don't know how to conduct myself in a defendant's position when we're not following the law. I don't know how to do that. You might as well move me over to you know Nazi Germany or something and let me figure out how to defend over there. I don't know their law either. I don't know what rules you guys are going by.

C: So it's my understanding that it's your position to enter a plea of nolo contendre on these three cases, case number nine zero two zero seven zero three seven, nine zero two four two five two zero . . .

D: Preserving my right to appeal.

C: . . . and zero three one nine four three three, reserving your right for appeal. Is that correct?

D: Just so we're clear. It will be correct in a minute. Just so that we're clear, twelve thirty-seven point five requires something else out of you again. And that means that somewhere along the line I have to count on you to follow the law, and it doesn't look like there's a lot of that going on. But it says I gotta do two things to keep my appeal together under twelve thirty-seven point five, and one of them is that I gotta file a written statement, executed under oath, which I got here and I'm ready to sign and hand to the court . . . after I make a modification, because I was talking about two cases, not three. And the second one is that you have to execute and file a certificate of probable cause for such appeal. Now, if you nut up on me there, there's a whole bunch of damned case law that I gotta go through and figure out what move to make, and then I gotta go through another goddamn session of learning the law that everybody's gonna ignore. But if you will certify these matters . . . if you will execute and file a certificate of probable cause on the appeal, on the issues that you know I'm talking about, they're all lined out in here . . . you want me to run them by you? 'Cause they're outlined in this right here. So you make up your mind now.

C: In this?

D: Yeah. It's in there.

C: Have you read it.

DA: No, I haven't read it. I think this is more appropriate. The court cannot deal with this until and after a plea has been taken and judgment has been entered. So, I'm not going to read this until and unless the defendant enters a plea of guilty or no contest to these charges. Otherwise I'm prepared to put the evidence on. I have the officers here. I have the officers available.

D: Begging your pardon, your honor . . .

DA: Excuse me Mr. Quigley!

D: Don't get excited, son. I thought you were done, or I wouldn't have interrupted.

C: Stop. Stop.

DA: When Mr. Quigley enters his plea of guilty or no contest to these charges, and the court pronounces judgment on Mr. Quigley, then it is upon the court to take the declaration of support for preserving cause and the court does not have to respond immediately. The court takes it under submission and the court signs a certificate of probable cause if the court deems probable cause for an appeal exists. It is not incumbent on the court to decide today, this minute, before a plea of guilty or no contest has been entered, to decide whether there's merit upon the plea of nolo contendre. Now, again, I'm going to re-state our position is that we are ready to go. Ah, either there is a plea entered or there's not. I'm not going to, I've been very lenient for the last half hour in allowing Mr. Quigley to make his record on Judicial Notice, and I have no objection to that. There are things that are subject to judicial notice. But if he wants to offer facts in now, and testimony about what Mr. Rico did or didn't do, that's what we have a trial for. That's what we have Deputies McConnell, VanHorsen and Rico for. So I agree with the court in that it's time for Mr. Quigley to either plead or go forward with the trial. Thank you.

D: I was up in court the other day, your honor, and I didn't stumble into this. I was up in court the other day and I listened to a gentleman who just happened to be an attorney, I know that because he's allowed to go before everybody else, and he was sitting up there talking to a judge that I think we all know and love by the name of Danner . . . I believe that somebody in this room actually has modeled under that guy for a while. And it was really interesting that before that attorney entered the plea on behalf of his client, that the bench acknowledged that in fact his rights to appeal were preserved with the enter of the plea. So he got assurance from the bench. I most certainly, your honor, did not intend to extend you beyond your jurisdiction . . . if you have any.

C: Okay, for the record. . . . You stated . . . as you've outlined your grounds for appeal, that I don't have jurisdiction on the matter, that you were asking for a verified complaint which you didn't get . . . and correct me if I misstate things . . . and three, you did not enter a plea . . . the court entered a plea on your behalf . . .

D: Did you say correct you if you're wrong?

C: Pardon me?

D: Did you say correct you . . . I do not mean to interrupt your reading. . . . There's a distinction between two and three. I asked for a verified complaint. The ruling from the Superior Court was that because the ticket was written on a form approved by the Judicial Council.

C: Correct.

D: As a separate matter, I demurred to the citation as a complaint because it does not substantially conform to nine fifty and nine fifty-two of the penal code. So, whether or not the ticket could be used as a complaint was asked and answered, and I still argue that; but once it's gonna be accepted as a complaint, whether or not it's going to be impervious to demur for defects on the fact of the complaint, is a separate issue and I intend to appeal that separate issue.

C: Okay.

D: So, does the fact that it's approved by the Judicial Council mean that the fact that these things are missing, these critical elements are missing, is that sustainable on demur. That's the real question there. So, that's the only distinction I wanna make. Can it be used as a complaint? Sure. But, I do not believe that the fact that it can be used as a complaint means that it is impervious to demur. You with me?

C: I'm with you.

D: Cool.

C: The next . . . put it in the record. It's what happened. You got the whole court record.

D: Yep.

C: Ah . . . three, four . . . (garbled)

D: The second issue is the public offense thing. I intend to appeal the finding of this court that this thing is not eligible for dismissal as the statute dictates . . . even with all the overwhelming evidence I brought. I'm just glad that except for what you introduced, that I don't have to face anything on appeal . . . relative to that matter. The third one was that I . . . the third major issue is that I challenge the constitutionality of the statute as applied, and want to appeal it as applied. You ruled that because it has been ruled constitutional as written, that everything's okay. And dee is the admissibility of evidence at trial, and again I go to the Bianco decision. I moved to have all that stuff stricken that has to do with helmet fabrication on the premise that it's absurd . . . absurd. I want to appeal your ruling in that regard as to allow all that testimony in. And I'm having a problem getting a record. And the issues ripe for appeal are one through nine, one through ten, starting on page six. Those will be the specific questions I'll be asking the court. And there may be some I left out, but that's . . . those are my basic questions.

C: Well sir . . . okay. . . . Item number four on page seven, you're raising the issue of forty six ten.

D: Yeah.

C: You're raising it?

D: Yeah. Yeah, where you at? What page you on?

C: Page seven. Item number four.

D: Page number four?

C: Page seven . . .

D: Page seven . . .

C: . . . item four.

D: . . . item four.

C: That's right across the space from line five.

D: Oh. Well, what I said goes back to what happened up stairs. Mr. Marigandi stated on the record on the record, in front of Art Danner, that I was not charged with any elements of four oh six one oh. I was not charged with four oh six one oh. I wanted to know what I was supposed to do relative to . . . he asked me for a plea, and I said on what? Because, the fact of the matter is, the way that two seven eight oh three operates, your honor, under four oh three oh two cee . . . the effect of that four oh six one oh, the application of four oh six one oh statute is that I'm tried and convicted by the officer when he writes the ticket and sentenced to having the nature of the citation changed from correctable to non-correctable. Va-voom, that's it. And there ain't no court ever gets involved in it. It's a determination made in the field as if it operates the way Mr. Marigandi proposes, and I suggest that's ridiculous.

C: So what you're asking from me is the fact that I find probable cause that you've got grounds to appeal.

D: On all them issues, yes sir. And I don't believe you have to agree that I have probable cause, your honor. I only think that you have to agree that I believe I have probable cause, if I understood it correctly.

DA: Well we'll check right now, okay?

C: Okay.

DA: I'm sorry, what was the court gonna say?

C: Let's find out what that says. Whether Mr. Quigley's reading . . .

D: (garbled)

C: That all I have to do is agree that you believe that you've got sufficient . . .

D: That's my understanding. I don't know that you reply anything that they're . . .

DA: Okay, may I . . . section twelve thirty-seven point five, operative January first, nineteen ninety-two, no appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendre, or revocation of probation following admission of a violation, except where both of the following are met . . . subsection a, the defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement executed under oath or penalty, showing reasonable, constitutional, jurisdictional or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings, and bee, the trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the county clerk. Um . . . this came from the library, so I can show it to the court (garbled). Again, it's been my experience while practicing that the court takes such applications for probable cause certification under submission, and then once (garbled). If the court is going to do that, I would ask that the court take it under submission, or course, upon a plea of guilty of nolo contendre.

C: (The court read the brief submitted by the defendant.) Mr. Quigley, in page seven, item number ten.

D: Yep.

C: I don't think that's something you can appeal. That's more of a statement on your part. If the law does not apply, and the appellate and higher court opinions are secondary to the opinions expressed by the prosecuting attorney, by what rules are trials on traffic matters to be conducted?

D: You want me to do that, you want me to do that by declaratory relief, your honor? How do I find out what the rules are. I've spent eight years gathering information as the law describes it. I'm sitting here today charged with citations, each one of which is clearly a violation of my fourth amendment rights as determined by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, U-S, up there in San Francisco. They've explained that the circumstances surrounding these tickets that I'm sitting here facing, every one of them constitutes a violation of my fourteenth amendment rights, and I'm having to enter a plea because this court won't follow the law. Now, what law . . . if you are following the law, I need to know which one it is . . . where do I go do the research? Where do I go dig up the stuff? Where do I go to find a way to defend myself? Because the law library ain't got it. It's make it up on the fly as near as I can tell. You're sitting here looking at what the appellate court says, that the Judicial Council's got no standing, so what are we gonna do? We're gonna . . . their opinion of this has got no standing, so what are we gonna do? We're gonna sit here and go to subdivision f, the legislature intended to provide an important safety benefit . . .

C: I am prepared. Mr. Quigley . . .

D: Nobody's proved that my helmet hasn't provided an important safety benefit.

C: Mr. Quigley . . . I am prepared to rule to the probable cause (garbled) appeal. How do you plead to the charges? First of all, sir, it's my understanding that you wish to change you plea and enter a plea of nolo contendre, subject to your right to appeal, is that correct?

D: Yep, one other thing, is a stipulation from the DA . . .

DA: I'm not stipulating to this. We have witnesses . . .

D: Cool. Don't stipulate to what you ain't heard yet. Do that. I get your attitude, buddy. Fifteen thirty-eight point five, subdivision m, your honor . . . talks about my right of appeal under fifteen thirty-eight point five, and one of the things that it indicates . . .

C: Let's just go ahead with the trials there.

D: Just hold on, your honor. One of the things that it indicates . . . how tough can this be? We got this one little thing and then I'm done. You got what you want. What we have is that we need an admission that at some stage in the proceedings, prior to conviction, I moved for suppression of evidence. That's it. That's all I'm asking. Now if he can't stipulate to that, where are we at?

DA: Well, we'll stipulate to that.

D: Cool. Now I've got two chances of somebody following the law and I get an appeal, in that case, against my will, and over my objection, and in absolute diametric to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, U-S, my rights have been violated under the fourth amendment, but I'm going to enter a plea of nolo contendre because under the rules you play by, I can't win. I have no way to defend myself.

C: Now before I accept your plea of nolo contendre to the charges, we have to do it one at a time, you do understand that by entering a plea of nolo contendre, you will . . . you're giving up your right to a trial . . .

D: Didn't know I had one. I'm giving my right up to whatever you're doing instead. Yeah, I understand that.

C: Hang on now. Be very careful, because, you understand that by entering a plea of nolo contendre, you're giving up the right to have a court trial? Do you understand that?

D: By giving up my right to a court trial, I'm saving myself from having a bunch of irrelevant evidence entered onto the record from which I can't climb over on appeal.

C: Mr. Quigley.

D: Yes sir.

C: What it says here is before I can accept your plea of nolo contendre, I have to make certain that you're aware of the rights you're giving up.

D: If I understood . . . If I were to enter a plea of guilty, your honor, it would mean the same thing as nolo contendre, but the fact of the matter is that am not even supposed to be charged, so nolo contendre. So nolo contendre is as close as I can come to overriding your plea of not guilty.

C: Which is fine, but we have to . . . for the record, you understand by entering your plea of nolo contendre you're giving up the right to the court trial. Do you understand that?

D: Yeah, there ain't gonna be a trial. I said that when I came in.

C: Okay.

D: There's not gonna be a trial

C: Do you also understand that by entering a plea of nolo contendre, you're giving up the right to question and cross-examine the officers?

D: Yeah. Yeah. About stuff they ain't supposed to testify about anyway.

C: Okay. You also have the right to subpoenaed evidence, and by entering your plea you're giving that right up?

D: I doesn't do any good. I subpoenaed the evidence. I didn't get it anyway. Nobody cares. So, yeah I give up my right not to do what it is that I'm supposed to get done. Sure. What do I care? Give up nothing?

C: And by entering the plea of nolo contendre, you are in essence testifying against yourself? Do you understand that?

D: As to what?

DA: Giving up his right to remain silent.

C: Correct, better way to put it. You're giving up your right to remain silent.

DA: By entering a plea of nolo contendre.

D: The issue of whether or not I remain silent would be a matter for trial. There ain't gonna be a trial, so what difference does it make?

C: But . . .

D: So, do I give up my right to not say anything at the trial we're not gonna have? Sure.

C: Then I'm gonna accept your pleas of nolo contendre on case number nine zero two zero seven zero three seven, that's the citation that was issued on June twenty-fourth or ninety-nine, correct?

D: (garbled) It don't matter to me. Yes. Whatever. Yes.

C: Thank you. Also on case number nine zero two four two five two zero, issued on June twenty-eighth of ninety-nine, I will accept your plea of nolo contendre. That's the plea you wish to enter, correct?

D: Sure.

C: And on nine zero three one nine four three three, a citation issued on nine twenty-eight of ninety-nine, you wish to enter a plea of nolo contendre on that, correct?

D: And one more comment before I do that, and that I also understand by doing this a very important right that you didn't mention, and that is I don't get to sue these bastards for violating my rights. I also give that up. That's the way the Federal Courts have been ruling, so I'm giving up another very important right, but yeah. Yeah, Mr. VanHorsen will get away until after the appeal.

DA: Your honor, on a factual basis on all three cases from the people's perspective, that Mr. Quigley was riding his motorcycle without a helmet.

C: Okay. The court will so make a . . .

D: What, what's a helmet? Hold it right there.

C: That's what you're appealing. That's what you're appealing, sir.

D: Excuse me?

C: That's what you're appealing.

D: He don't know what the Hell he's talking about. He uses words he don't know what they mean. He don't know what a helmet is? Did I violate two seven eight oh three? I have pled guilty to violating two seven eight oh three. Let's leave it at that.

C: Good enough. Court is now adjourned.

DA: Pardon me, your honor? (garbled)

C: Ah, yes.

D: Don't get mad. He's gonna fine me and I'm gonna work in the law library. They've been waiting for me anyway.

C: Okay.

D: Can I do community service, your honor? Is there any reason why I can't do community service?

C: I have no objection to you doing community service.

D: Cool. The law librarian will be tickled to death with that.

C: First, Mr. Quigley . . .

D: Yeah.

C: Ah, do you wish to be sentenced today, or do you want to come back a week from today?

D: Oh, I don't give a damn. Do whatever you wanna do.

C: I'm asking you.

D: It doesn't make any difference. You know, it's a twenty-five dollar fine. But you ain't gonna fine me twenty-five dollars. I know that, and that's gonna be another issue on appeal.

C: Seventy-seven per ticket.

D: It ain't seventy-seven. Look it up. It's twenty-five dollars. Twenty-five dollar fine, but you go ahead. You charge me seventy-seven, and we'll make that an issue on appeal. I hate to do it, but we're going to. It's a twenty-five dollar fine. Has been since the day it was put in.

C: So you wish to be sentenced today, sir?

D: Yeah.

C: On line one, seventy-seven dollars, that works out to eleven hours of community service. On line two, seventy-seven dollars, works out out to eleven hours of community service. On line three, it's one fifty-three.

D: Why?

C: Because you've got counts a and bee.

D: What do you mean a and bee?

C: Prepared to dismiss . . .

D: Hold on. What do you mean a and bee.

DA: Just leave it a.

C: Count bee will be dismissed in the interest of justice, per the motion of the District Attorney.

D: What is count bee?

C: Twenty-seven eight oh three a and bee.

D: You don't wanna be dismissing . . .

C: The bee section has just been dismissed per the DA.

D: You really don't wanna do that. You wanna go back there and dismiss a if you're gonna dismiss one.

DA: Fine. We won't. We withdraw that.

D: No. Dismiss a. Don't be an idiot, man. A is not a crime.

C: Wait. Wait. Wait. Hold it. Mr. Quigley. Last time you were in court, ah you took objection to Mr. Marigandi . . .

D: I didn't call him an idiot. I told him not to be. He's sitting there trying to argue with me.

C: Please.

D: Bee is not . . . bee is the citation. A is not a crime. It does not say it's unlawful. Bee is the enactment. All I'm trying to do is save him the embarrassment of being a fool down the road.

C: Good enough. A is dismissed per the motion of the District Attorney.

D: Thank you.

C: Seventy-seven dollars . . . it works out to eleven . . . thirty-three hours of total community service. Thirty-three hours should be completed by?

D: I don't know. I'll go up and check with Pat? Give me ah three months.

C: August thirtieth?

D: Give me three months . . . huh?

C: September 30th.

DA: Doesn't he go to community options?

C: Yeah. You do have to go to the community options center first and sign up with them.

D: Okay, whatever. I'll have her take care of telling me where to go and give her the money. You done with me?

C: No.

D: Really?

C: Right

DA: Witnesses are excused, your honor?